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Abstract: 
The fundamental updating process in the 
tmnsfemble belief model is related to Lhe concept 
of specialization and can be described by a 
specialization matrix. The degree of belief in the 
truth of a proposition is a degree of justified 
support. The Principle of Minimal Commitment 
implies that one should never give more support 
to the truth of a proposition than justified. We 
show that Dempster's rule of conditioning 
corresponds essentially to the least commitled 
specialization, and that Dempster's rule of 
combination results essentially from 
commutativity requirements. The concept of 
generalization, dual to the concept of 
specialization, is described. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
The dynamic of belief in the Dcmpster-Shafer theory is 
achieved by the application of Dempster's rule of 
conditioning and Dempster's rule of combination. Their 
appropriateness has been questioned (Levi 1983, Kyburg 
1987, Pearl 1990, Voorbracht 1991). But most criticisms 
result from the fact that the Dcmpstcr-Shafcr theory is 
understood as a special form of upper and lower 
probability theory. 
In response to these criticisms, one of us (Smets 1988, 
199Ib, Smets and Kenncs 1990) developed the transferable 
belief model (TBM), a model to quantify Yourl belief. 
The TBM is build without using any concept of 
probability, hence the criticisms against the use of 
Dempster's rules do not apply (Smcts, 1991 a). But l.here 
l·vou' is the agent that entertains the bel icfs considered in 
this presentation. 
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is still the question of explaining why they should be 
used. This paper presents such a justification. 
We present the needed material about the TBM in section 
2. In section 3, we introduce the Principle of 
Minim al Com m itm ent. It consists in never giving 
more support to the elements of the domain of our beliefs 
than justified. When necessary, it permits us to select the 
least informative belief function in a set of equally 
justified belief functions. 
In section 4, we study the dynamic components of the 
TBM, and in particular the expansion process, i.e. the 
addition of a belief without retracting any old beliefs 
(Gardenfors 1988). In the TBM, this expansion process is 
modeled by specialization matrices, i.e. operators that 
reallocate the basic belief masses that quantify our beliefs. 
The justification of both Dempster's rules is presented in 
section 5. It proceeds as follows. 
When conditioning on an event A, the updated beliefs 
should give a null plausibility to A as A becomes 
impossible. The specialization matrix that satisfies that 
requirement and that induces the minimal commitment 
updating leads to an updated belief identical to the one 
obtained by the application of Dempster's rules of 
conditioning. 
It seems natural to require that combinations of pieces of 
evidence commute among them and with any 
conditioning. Dempster's rule of combination is the 
unique solution satisfying these commutativity 
requirements. 
These results provide justifications for the use of 
Dempster's rules when beliefs must be expanded by new 
pieces of evidence. 
2. THE TRANSFERABLE BELIEF 
MODEL. 
The transferable belief model covers the same domain of 
application as the subjective probability model except that 
beliefs are quantified by belief functions, not by 
probability functions. Let Q be a finite set of elements, 
called the frame of discernment. At most one of the 
elements of n corresponds to the actual state of affair, but 
we do not know which one. We can only assess the 
degrees of belief that this particular element belongs to the 
various subsets of n. 
In the transferable belief model, a uniLary amount of belief 
is postulated, and it is distributed over the subsets of n. 
The part of belief m(A) given to A, called a basic belief 
mass (bbm), quantifies the part of our belief that 
supports A and does not support any strict subset of A due 
to lack of information. The bbm m(A) for A� Q are non 
negative and 
I. m(A) = 1. 
A�Q 
The function m:2n-) [0, 1] is cal led a bas ic belief 
assignment (bba). The degree of belief bei(A) 
allocated to a subset A of n is the sum of the parts of 
beliefs m(X) given to subsets X of A that are not subsets 
of A (so 0 is not included): 
bel(A) = L m(X) 
�X�A 
The degree of plausibility pi(A) quantifies the 
maximum amount of belief that might support A: 
pl(A) = bei(Q)- bel(A) = L m(X) 
XnA� 
The commonal ity function q:2n�[0,1) is defined as 
q(A) = I_ m(B) 
A�B 
It does not have any practical interpretation but is most 
useful to represent Dempster's rule of combination (sec 
below). 
A vacuous belief function is a belief function such 
that bel(A)=O V Atn, and bcl(Q) = 1. It quantifies our 
belief in a state of total ignorance. The corresponding bba 
(where m(!l)=I) and plausibility function (where pi(A) = 1 
V A �  n, At,0), are called the vacuous bba and 
plausib ility function. 
Basic belief assignments� belief functions, plausibility 
functions and commonality functions arc in one to one 
correspondence (Shafer 1976). The same indexing will be 
used to show which functions arc linked together through 
that correspondence. 
One should note that no normalization is introduced, m(0) 
may be positive, and bci(Q) and pl(Q) may be less than 
one (Smets 1992). The conclusions still apply when 
normalization is introduced. 
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3. THE PRINCIPLE OF MINIMAL 
COMMITMENT. 
Let n = {a, b, c). Suppose You know only that Myl 
belief function over Q is such that belMe({a)) = .3 and 
beiMe({b,c)) = .5, and You do not know the value I give 
to bclMe for the other subsets of n. Suppose You have 
no other information on Q and You are ready to adopt My 
belief as Yours. How to build Your belief given these 
partial constraints. Many belief functions can satisfy 
them. If you adopt the principle that subsets of n should 
not get more suppon than justified, then Your belief on il 
will be such that my0u({a))=.3, my0u({b,c))=.5 and 
my0u({ a,b,c) )=.2. Among all belief functions compatible 
with the constraints given by known values of belMe• 
bely0u is the one that gives the smallest degree of belief 
to every subsets of n. The principle evokes here is called 
the Principle of Minimal Commitment. It is 
really at the core of the TBM, where degrees of belief are 
degrees of 'justified' supports. 
With un-normalized belief functions, the principle 
definition is essentially based on the plausibility function. 
Suppose two plausibility functions plJ and pl2 such 
We say that pl2 is not more committed than plt (and less 
committed if there is at least one strict inequality). The 
same qualification is extended to their related bba and 
belief functions. Among all belief functions on Q, the 
least committed belief function is the vacuous belief 
function (i.e. its bbm m(Q)=l). 
When expressed with belief functions, the principle 
becomes: 
belt (A) + m 1 (0) � bei2(A) + m2(0) VA �Q. 
The concept of 'least commitment' permit the 
construction of a partial order = on the set of belief 
functions (Yager 1986, Dubois and Prade 1986). 
We write: 
pl1 = pl2 
to denote that piJ is equal to pl2 or more committed than 
pl2. By analogy the following notations m 1 = m2 and 
belt = bel2 have the same meaning. 
The Principle of Minimal Commitment consists 
in selecting the least committed belief function in a set of 
equally justified belief functions. The principle formalizes 
1 'I' (or 'Me') is an agent different from 'You'. 
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the idea that one should never give more support than 
justified to any subset of Q. It satisfies a form of 
skepticism, of uncommitment, of conservatism in the 
allocation of our belief. In its spirit, it is not far from 
what the probabilists try to achieve with the maximum 
entropy principle (see Dubois and Prade 1987, Hsia, 1991, 
Smets 199Ic) 
4. THE DYNAMIC OF THE 
TRANSFERABLE BELIEF MODEL. 
In order to build the operators for conditioning and 
combinations, we formalize the concept of evidential 
corpus (see Levi 1980 for a similar corpus). We define EC 
as the e vidential corpus, i.e. the set of all Your 
evidence at a given time. Let ECt and EC2 be two 
evidential corpus. ECt and EC2 are said to be equivalent 
(relative to Q) if for every piece of evidence E, EC1 uE 
and EC2uE induce the same bba on n. We say that an 
evidence E is compatible with EC if ECuEif:_i where _i 
is the contradiction. We say that an evidence E is vacuous 
(relative to Q) if EC and ECuE are equivalent (relative to 
Q) for every EC. A tautology is a typical example of a 
vacuous evidence. 
Among others, change in Your beliefs can be due to 
expansion, i.e. the addition to EC of an evidence that is 
compatible with EC. We analyze in detail the expansion 
process within the TBM where it is represented by two 
rules: the Dempster rule of conditioning and the 
Dempster rule of combination. We explain first the 
nature of the two rules before introducing the concept of a 
specialization matrix that wi II represent the general 
operator corresponding to the expansion. 
Consider first the expansion of Your EC by the fact that 
all elements of A are impossible. It corresponds to the 
conditioning process on A. As You learn that the 
elements in A arc now impossible, the bbm m(X) that 
was supporting X supports now XnA, so m(X) is 
transferred to XnA. This transfer of bbm results in the 
unnormalized Dempster rule of' conditioning. The 
updated bba rnA and belief function belA arc: 
rnA (B)= � m(BuY) for B<:A 
0,.tY<:A 
0 otherwise 
Now let EC be Your evidential corpus and let E be a non­
vacuous evidence (relative to Q). We say that E is distinct 
from EC if there is no non-vacuous evidence F such that 
EI=F and EC1=F. If it were not the case, than F would be 
a pieces of evidence included in both EC and E and the 
beliefs they induce on Q would result among other from 
some common underlying evidence F. 
Let the evidence E be distinct from the evidential corpus 
EC. Let rna and m1 be the bba on Q induced by EC and 
E, respectively. The problem is to build the bba mo 1 
induced by ECuE. Shafer (1976) proposed to compute 
mot from mo and m1 by applying Dempster's rule of 
combination. The Ell symbol is also used to denote this 
combination. So 
rna I = moEllm I 
arxi bei01 = beloEf)bei1 
where bela I is the belief function induced by the bba mol 
with 
L mo(AuY)m 1 (AuZ) \:fA<;;;; n 
YnZ=0Y,Z<;;;;A 
In particular one has: 
q01 (A)= qo(A) q 1 (A) 
Both rules have already received some justifications 
presented without assuming any underlying probabilistic 
model. For the conditioning rule, Nguyen and Smets 
(1991) show that Bel(AIB) is the minimal commitment 
solution for the belief of the conditional object AlB 
(Goodman, Nguyen et al., 1991, Goodman, Gupta et 
al.1991). For the combination rule, Smets (1990), 
Klawonn and Schwecke (1990), Dubois and Prade (1986), 
Hajek (1992) provide sets of algebraic requirements that 
justify it. Another justification based on the concepts of 
commutative specialization is presented here. 
5. SPECIALIZATIONS. 
The concept of specialization is at the core of the 
transferable belief model interpretation of the belief 
allocation by belief functions. Let mo be a bba induced on 
n by Your initial EC. The impact of adding a new 
evidence E to EC induces a change in Your beliefs 
characterized by a redistribution of the initial rna such that 
the bbm m(A) given to the subset A of Q is distributed 
among the subsets of A. Let s(A,B)E [0, 1] be the 
proportion of m(A) that flows into B k A when the new 
evidence E is added to EC. In order to conserve the whole 
mass m(A) after this transfer, the s(A,B) must satisfy: 
I s(A,B ) = 1 
B<:A 
As masses can flow only to subsets, then s(A,B) = 0 
V'B� A. The matrix S of the coefficient s( A,B) for 
A,B<:Q is called a specialization matrix on Q (see 
Yager 1986, Dubois and Prade 1986, Kruse and Schwecke 
1990, Moral 1985, Delgado and Moml1987). 
After the expansion of EC by E, the initial bba mo is 
transformed into the new bba m such that: 
m(A);;;; L s(X,A) mo (X) 
x<;;;;n 
The bba m is called a specialization of mo. We write m"' 
mo·S to represent the specialization of mo into m by S. 
Whenever a bba m is a specialization of a bba mo. then m 
is at least as committed as mo (Yager 1986). So 
mo·S smo for any bba mo and any specialization matrix 
S (all defined on Q). 
It is easy to show that the effects of both Dempster's rules 
can be obtained by specialization matrices. 
Let m: 2n--) [0,1] be a bba and L be the set of 
specialization matrices on n. 
I) To obtain Dempster's rule of conditioning, let 
C<;;;;Q and let Sc be the specialization matrix such that 
SC(A,B)"' 1 
0 
ifB = AnC 
otherwise 
Let me be the bba obtained after conditioning the bba m 
on C by Dempster's rule of conditioning. Then me "' 
m·S c. We call Sc the C-conditioning specialization 
matrix. We define :Econd<;;;;I. as the set of C-conditioning 
specializations where ccn. 
2) To obtain Dempster's rule ot" combination, let 
m be a bba on Q and Jet Sm be a specialization matrix 
with coefficients 
VA,BCn 
where IDA is the bba obtained after conditioning the bba 
m on A by Dempster's rule of conditioning. The 
coefficients sm(A,B) satisfy: 
sm(O,B) = m(B) 
and Sm{A,B) = L sm(n,BuX ) VB<;;;;A 
XCA 
0 otherwise 
Let m' be a bba. One can prove that m'EBm = m'·Sm. The 
commutativity of m'·Sm is not obvious but is present as 
one has also m'·Sm = m·Sm·· 
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S m is called the Dempster ian s pecialization 
matrix associated with m as it updates any m' on n 
into mEB m'. We define :ED<;;;; I. as the set of the 
Dempsterian specialization matrices. 
In particular , if m is such that m(C) = I (the bba that 
corresponds to a conditioning on C), then Sc =Sm , so 
Lcond<;;;;:ED. 
We consider that the expansion procedure by the 
specialization is one of the fundamental ideas for the 
dynamic part of the transferable belief model. In that 
model, the bba m(X) given to x<;;;; n corresponds to that 
part of our belief that supports X without supporting any 
strict subset of X and which can be transferred to subsets 
of X if further information justifies iL Therefore we can 
accept that every expansion is defined by a specialization 
matrix. We will show that : 
I. W hen conditioning on ACQ, SAE :Econd is the 
specialization matrix that induces the least committed 
beliefs on n derivable by a specialization and such that 
the updated plausibility given to A is 0. The requirement 
pi( A )=0 after expansion translates the fact that all 
elements of n in A are impossible. 
2. :Eo is the largest family of specialization matrices that 
commute and that includes Lcond· The commutativity 
translates the idea that the expansion by two pieces of 
evidence should lead to the same result whatever the order 
with which they are considered. It is classically required 
for any expansion opemtor (Gardenfors 1988). 
6. DEMPSTER'S RULES IN THE VIEW 
OF SPECIALIZATIONS. 
We first show that SAE :Econd is the specialization matrix 
that induces the least committed belief on Q derivable by 
a specialization and such that the updated plausibility 
given to A is 0 .  
Theorem 1: Dempster's rule of conditioning . 
Let e<;;;; Q and let L* = { Se :E I 'V m: if m'=m·S then 
pl'(C)=O}, where pi' denotes the plausibility function 
induced by m'=m·S. Let Sc be the C-conditioning 
specialization matrix with 
sc(A,B)=1 
sc(A,B)=O 
ifB=AnCand 
otherwise. 
Then See L* and the bba m·Sc is the least committed 
* bba among the bba m·S for Se 1: : 
* m·Scsm·S 'VSe:E. 
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Proof. Let m be a bba over Q. Let Se r:*. Let m'=m·S. 
One must have 
O=pl'(C)== L m'(B) 
BnC�0 
= L L m(A) · s(A,B) 
BnC�0 B�;;;A 
It must be true for all bba m on Q. Therefore s(A,B)::::O for 
all B satisfying B�C and for all A�Q. LetS be such a 
specialization matrix. 
pl'(D)= L m'(B) = 2. 2. m(A)·s(A,B) 
BnD"I2l Br>D•0 B;;;A 
= L L, m(A)·s(A,B) 
s;;;cn,-,o .. 0 n;;;A 
= 2. m(A) I, s(A, B) 
Ano,-,c .. 0 n;;;AvCllnD•0 
� :L m(A) 
AnD,-,C•0 
For any m, Jet pic be the plausibility function induced by 
mc==m·Sc. 
plc(D) = I. me( B)= I. L m(A) · sc(A, B) 
B,-,D,.0 u,-,D,.0H�;A 
= L, m(A) 
Ar>D,-,C•0 
So whatever the bbm m on n, VD� Q, plc(D)�pi'(D). 
So pic is the least committed plausibility function 
among those induced by m·S for Se r:*. QED 
Since Dempster's rule of conditioning is idempotent, so 
are the conditioning specialization matrices. 
Lemma 1: The specializations matrices Se I:cond arc 
idempotent. 
We prove that Eo is the largest set of specialization 
matrices that commULe among themselves and that 
includes I:cond· 
Theorem 2: Dempster's rule ol' combination. 
Let Stei: such that for all c�n: StSc=Scs1 with 
See I:cond· Then S 1 e Eo holds. 
Proof. Let s1,c = s1sc with elements s1,c(A,B): 
s1,c(A,B)= 2. s1(A,D)·Sc(D,B) 
o;;;n 
= L, s1(A,BuX)·sc(BuX,B) 
xd:,-,A 
L, s1 (A,Bu X) if B� C 
X;;;C,-,A 
0 otherwise 
Let Sc,l == ScS1 with elements SC,t(A,B): 
sc.1 (A, B)= L, sc(A, D)· s1 (D, B) = s1 (An C, B) 
o;;;n 
Thus for all A,B,C� n, one must have: 
s1(AnC,B)= b s1(A,BuX) ifB�C 
X;;;C,-,A 
= 0 otherwise 
If we set A=n, we obtain for all B.C�n. 
St(C,B)= .2', st(il,BuX) if B �C 
x�c 
= 0 otherwise 
which implies that S 1 is Dempsterian. QED 
Since the Dempster rule of combination is associative and 
commutative, the Dcmpsterian specialization matrices 
commute. 
Theorem 3: If Sm 1, Sm2 E Eo, then Sm 1·Sm2 = 
Smz -Sm l · 
Proof: mo·Sm 1·Sm2 = (moEBm t)·Sm2 = 
(morllm t)ffim2 = moffim 1 rllmz = moffim2cllm 1 = 
(morllm2)·Sm 1 = mo·Sm2·Sm1 QED 
Note : Let m be a bba on n, with q its related 
commonality function. Let Sm be the Dempsterian 
specialization matrix generated by m. LetT be the matrix 
that transforms a bba into a commonality function, where 
the elements tAB ofT are: ' 
lA,B = 1 
0 
ifB�A�n 
otherwise 
It can be shown that 1°) the commonalities q(A): A�n, 
are the diagonal elements and the eigenvalues of Sm and 
2") the lines of T- 1 are the eigenvectors of Sm 1. One has 
1 The row vector t is an eigenvector of the matrix S if tS 
= A.t where A. is a scalar. 
the representation: Sm = T A T" 1 where A is a diagonal 
matrix with elements "A.A,A = q(A), A<: Q. Among 
others, this property may be useful when m(Q) ;:::: 0, in 
which case the theory of genemlized inverses described in 
matrix calculus can be helpful. 
7. ANOTHER CHARACTERIZATION 
OF DEMPSTER'S RULE OF 
COMBINATION. 
To understand this theorem, consider that My EC induces 
the bba mo on n. I want to build a specialization matrix 
S ready to combine the impact of any new evidence 
distinct from EC, i.e. to specialize any new bba m on n. 
Let Io be the set of the specialization matrices S such 
that the application of S on any m on Q would be at least 
as committed as mo. One of the elemcms of Eo is Smo· 
the Dempsterian specialization matrix generated by mo. 
For any bba m on Q, the bba m·S mo is less commiucd 
than the other bba m·S that could be obtained by the usc 
of the other specialization matrices S of Eo. Dempster's 
rule of combination sati sfies that form of minimal 
commitment. 
Theorem 4: Let mo be a bba on n. Let Eo = ( Se E I 
'Vm: m·S � mo } .  Then Sm0e Eo and VSe Eo. \fm, m·S 
'== m·Smo · 
Proof. Sm oE Eo holds, since m ·S mo = mEBmo '= mo. 
Let So=Smo· Let SeEo. For A<;;;;n, we define the bba 
m�A) by m�A)(B) ;:::: s(A,B) with corresponding 
plausibility function pi�AJ. 
Let m be the bba with m(A)= 1. 
m.S = m�A) and therefore m�AJ '= mo implying 
Now let m be an arbitrary bba on n. Let pi' be the 
plausibility function corresponding to m·S. 
pl'(A)= L, L, m(C)·s(C,B) 
= L, L m(C)·s(C,B) 
CnA,.0 Bl:C UnA,.0 
= L, m(C) · pl�CJ(A) 
CnA,.0 
� L, m(C) · pl��J(A) = pl"(A) 
CnA,.0 
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where pi" denotes the plausibility function corresponding 
to mo·So and the inequality results from (*). QED 
8. GENERALIZATION TO 
CONTRACTION OF BELIEFS AND 
DISJUNCTIVE COMBINATIONS. 
The presentation centered around the expansion process. 
But it can be adapted in a direct way to the inverse process 
of contraction, i.e. the change in belief where a belief is 
eliminated from the evidential corpus EC. The 
specialization matrices encountered in the expansion 
processes are replaced by de-specialization matrices. The 
de-specialization matrices are the (matricial) inverse of the 
specialization matrices. In contrast with the specialization 
matrices, they should not be applied to any bba, but only 
to a subset of bba that depends on the de-specialization 
matrix. This constraint reflects the fact that one can not 
eliminate from EC an evidence that had not been 
previously added to EC. 
Pieces of evidence are combined conjunctively in the 
expansion: the aim is to compute the belief function beiE 
and F induced by the conjunction 'E and F of two pieces 
of evidence E and F from the belief functions beiE and 
beiF induced by each piece of evidence. In the retraction, 
the process can be seen as a special form of conjunctive 
combination. Eliminating evidence E from the EC that 
contains only the two distinct pieces of evidence E and F 
consists in adding the information 'eliminate E'. It aims at 
computing belf from beiE and F and belE (in practice an 
easy task when commonality functions are considered as 
\fA <:;;;Q qf(A) = QE and f(A) I qE(A)). 
One can define the processes of disjunctive combination of 
evidence that is dual to the conjunctive combination. The 
typical example is illustrated by the case where Your 
initial ECo is vacuous, where You know belE and belf, 
and you can add only 'E or F' to ECQ. You must 
established belE or F from beiE and beiF. The disjunctive 
rule of combination has been defined and justified in 
Smets (199lc), the major result being that the product of 
bbm mE(A) and mF(B) is transferred to AuB in mE or F· 
and \fA <:Q belE or f(A) = belE(A) belf(A). 
The dual in the disjunctive context of the specialization 
matrix encountered in the conjunctive context is called a 
generalization matrix G. It is also a stochastic matrix 
where the elements g(A,B) are null \fA CJ,. B <;;;; n. It 
represents the fact that a bbm m(A) is distributed among 
the supersets of A. The dual of the conditioning process is 
called the enlargement process. Let m' be the enlargement 
on A of a bba m. Then the conditioning of m' on any 
subset Xu Y of Q with XC: A and y<;;;; A will give the 
same result whatever y<:;;; A. The enlargement transforms 
m into m' where the elements of A become 'indiscernible' 
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(in that no subset of A receives a support that is not given 
to the whole A). 
The next table summarizes the dual relations. 
evidence combination 
from be!E and beiF 
expansion matrices 
retraction matrices 
single fact 
combination 
conjunctive 
be!E and F 
specialization 
de·speciali1.ation 
conditioning 
de.conditioning 
conjunctive rule 
disjunctive 
bciE or F 
generalization 
de·gcneralization 
enlargement 
dc·cnlargcment 
disjunctive rule 
Finally it can also be shown that the dual and the inverse 
relations are in one-to-one correspondence. To any de ­
specialization matrix corresponds a generalization maJrix, 
and vice versa. So we do not have four processes, but only 
two. Which of each pair of equivalent npproachcs is more 
convenient depends on the context. 
9. CONCLUSIONS. 
We provide justifications for Dempster's rule of 
conditioning and Dempster's rule of combination based on 
the following assumptions: 
I. the expansion of any evidential corpus EC by an 
evidence E induces an updating from a prior bba mo into a 
posterior bba m I such that m 1 is a specialization or mo. 
2. if the evidence E says that all clements in A �narc 
impossible , then the specialization m 1 should be such 
that pl I (A )=0, and the least committed spccializntion m 1 
is the one ob tained by applying Dempster's rule of 
conditioning on mo. 
3. the result of the expansion or Your EC by two pieces 
of evidence should be independent of the order with which 
the two pieces of evidence are taken in consideration. 
Therefore commutativity is required for the specialization 
matrices that represent these expansions, including those 
describing the condit ion ing process. The only 
specialization matrices satisfying these commutativity 
requirements are such that the result of their app lication is 
the same as the one obtained by the application of 
Dempster 's rule of combination . 
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